With security agencies looking out and protecting against the ALPHV Blackcat attack group, researchers have noticed a change in tactics, so the feds released an updated warning against the ransomware group.

To that end, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) released an update to the joint advisory it first released in April 2022 and then again in December 2023.

ALPHV Blackcat actors have since employed improvised communication methods by creating victim-specific emails to notify of the initial compromise. Since mid-December 2023, of the nearly 70 leaked victims, the healthcare sector has been the most commonly victimized. This is likely in response to the ALPHV Blackcat administrator’s post encouraging its affiliates to target hospitals after operational action against the group and its infrastructure in early December 2023.

ALPHV Blackcat affiliates use advanced social engineering techniques and open source research on a company to gain initial access. Actors pose as company IT and/or helpdesk staff and use phone calls or SMS messages to obtain credentials from employees to access the target network. ALPHV Blackcat affiliates use uniform resource locators (URLs) to live-chat with victims to convey demands and initiate processes to restore the victims’ encrypted files.

After gaining access to a victim network, ALPHV Blackcat affiliates deploy remote access software such as AnyDesk, Mega sync, and Splashtop in preparation of data exfiltration. ALPHV Blackcat affiliates create a user account, “aadmin,” and use Kerberos token generation for domain access.

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After gaining access to networks, they use legitimate remote access and tunneling tools, such as Plink and Ngrok. ALPHV Blackcat affiliates claim to use Brute Ratel C4 and Cobalt Strike as beacons to command and control servers.

ALPHV Blackcat affiliates use the open source adversary-in-the-middle attack framework Evilginx2, which allows them to obtain multifactor authentication (MFA) credentials, login credentials, and session cookies. The actors also obtain passwords from the domain controller, local network, and deleted backup servers to move laterally throughout the network.

To evade detection, affiliates employ allowlisted applications such as Metasploit. Once installed on the domain controller, the logs end up cleared on the exchange server. Then Mega.nz or Dropbox moves, exfiltrates, and/or downloads victim data. The ransomware then deploys, and the ransom note ends up embedded as a file.txt. According to public reporting, affiliates have additionally used POORTRY and STONESTOP to terminate security processes.

Some ALPHV Blackcat affiliates exfiltrate data after gaining access and extort victims without deploying ransomware. After exfiltrating and/or encrypting data, ALPHV Blackcat affiliates communicate with victims via TOR, Tox, email, or encrypted applications. The threat actors then delete victim data from the victim’s system.

ALPHV Blackcat affiliates offer to provide unsolicited cyber remediation advice as an incentive for payment, offering to provide victims with “vulnerability reports” and “security recommendations” detailing how they penetrated the system and how to prevent future re-victimization upon receipt of ransom payment.

The ALPHV Blackcat encryptor results in a file with the following naming convention: RECOVER-(seven-digit extension) FILES.txt.

Click here to view the entire advisory.

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