Memory unsafe code is a major problem for software manufacturers and their customers.

Previous attempts to solve the issue only made partial gains, and today, two-thirds of reported vulnerabilities in memory unsafe programming languages still relate to memory issues.

That is why the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, the National Security Agency (NSA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the cybersecurity authorities of Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and New Zealand joined together to write “The Case for Memory Safe Roadmaps: Why Both C-Suite Executives and Technical Experts Need to Take Memory Safe Coding Seriously.”

The guidance tries to explain how software manufacturers can eliminate memory safety vulnerabilities by transitioning to memory safe programming languages.

Memory safety vulnerabilities are the most prevalent type of disclosed software vulnerability, according to the guidance.

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They are a class of well-known and common coding errors that attackers routinely exploit. These vulnerabilities represent a major problem for the software industry as they cause manufacturers to continually release security updates and their customers to continually patch.

These vulnerabilities persist despite software manufacturers historically expending significant resources attempting to reduce their prevalence and impact through various methods, including analyzing, patching, publishing new code and investing in training programs for developers, according to the guidance. Add on top of that, customers expend significant resources responding to these vulnerabilities through onerous patch management programs and incident response activities.

The guidance provides manufacturers steps for creating and publishing memory safe roadmaps that will show customers how they are owning security outcomes, embracing radical transparency, and taking a top-down approach to developing secure products.

Memory safe programming languages (MSLs) can eliminate memory safety vulnerabilities. Therefore, transitioning to MSLs would likely greatly lessen the need to invest in activities aimed at reducing these vulnerabilities or minimizing their impact.

Additionally, investments to migrate unsafe codebases to MSLs would pay long-term dividends in the form of safer products – defraying some of the upfront cost of transitioning to MSLs.

Click here for more on the Secure by Design guidance.

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