By Gregory Hale
Simply put, a software bill of materials (SBOM) is a list of ingredients; it does not provide risk analysis, but rather, it is a tool that allows you to do risk analysis.

“An SBOM is a list of ingredients,” said Eric Byres, senior partner at ICS Secure, during his talk entitled “The Final SBOM: A Candid Farewell” at the inaugural Level Zero OT Cybersecurity 2025 Conference in Atlanta, Georgia. “It’s like a can of soup, and on that can of soup, it says it’s got a bunch of ingredients. SBOMS are the same thing.

“I bought a package from a large OEM that is a PLC or a DCS, and it says it’s from a specific company. What is in that? Because the company didn’t write the entire code stack. They have proprietary software they bought from third parties. They’ve got software they wrote on their own, and they’ve got open-source software. It’s just the fact nobody writes code from top to bottom themselves. So, what is included in the product you just bought? That’s the job of the SBOM. It’s an ingredients list. It’s nothing more.”

Unlike a can of tomato soup, SBOMs are a tree of ingredients, Byres said.

Schneider Bold
Big Ugly Trees

“We can say this component contains this component, which contains this component. Sometimes those trees are big. We’ve seen trees that are 25 deep, and we’ve seen trees that are 100 wide. That actually turns out to be a real problem,” Byres said. “When you’re hunting an SBOM, there are big ugly trees for some products. We’ve seen SBOMs with 10,000 components in it. We’ve seen SBOMs with 2 million components in them. You take an operating system like Windows, the current version of Windows, there’s a lot of components in that software.”

Challenges are the breadth and depth and the complexity of the SBOMs and the fact there are no unique identifiers, Byres said.

“The other thing is an SBOM is not a risk analysis. It’s a tool to let you do a risk analysis,” he said. “You cannot tell from an SBOM what is risky and what is not. You should not use the SBOM for that function.”

Additionally, Byres said, there’s no perfect SBOM. There are a number of reasons for that. One of them is the namespace problem.

In that regard, Byres discussed one product, a PLC from GE Fanuc.

“It says GE Fanuc on the label,” Byres said. “You want to know if there are vulnerabilities in there? Go search the National Vulnerability Database for GE Fanuc, and you know what you’ll get? Zero. Nothing.

Where are the Vulnerabilities?

“Now, let me tell you, I tackled that thing (in the past) and provided GE with a crapload of vulnerabilities on that box. They’re out there. They’re listed. But I can’t find it by searching GE Fanuc. Why is that? Well, let’s go a little history here. GE has a lot of names. So does Fanuc. Which one do I hunt for? GE is not a good solution either. And Fanuc is not a good solution.

“And, oh, by the way, they changed the name and they called the product the GE Fanuc Automation. And then they changed the name again and they called it GE Fanuc Intelligent Platforms. Then Fanuc went bye-bye. So, then they changed the name again, and it was GE Intelligent Platforms. And then they were with Alstom, and they changed the name again, and then Emerson bought the whole thing. So, when you go search the National Vulnerability Database, you have, I believe, about 800 names you could search for. This is the problem.”

The databases are not consistent. Byres said. If you go to the National Vulnerability Database, the right thing to search for is Emerson. However, if you go to CISA, Emerson is the wrong thing to search for. You search for GE.

“This is where the SBOM, I believe, made a fatal mistake,” he said. “You can only have one entry in the SBOM for supplier. I can absolutely tell you that every SBOM, every SBOM company, whether the SBOM is coming from a binary or source or whatever, will put in a different name for every subcomponent in there, for the name of the product, the name of the supplier, and even the version numbers are not consistent.”

SBOM Positives

One of the positives an SBOM provides is speed to understand if you have vulnerable software.

In the Log4j issue a few years back, it took one company two weeks to phone all their suppliers to get a handle on what software they had on their systems.

On the other hand, when the SolarWInds attack occurred, it took a company two hours to find out if they had vulnerable software. Understanding the ingredients in the software package makes a huge issue between fixing vulnerable software and getting hit in a cyberattack.

“Two weeks ago, just as I was headed out the door, I noticed this vulnerability coming out on Apache Tomcat,” Byres said. “Tomcat is in all sorts of places that that nobody knows about. It is rampant through OT systems, and it’s not well-supported, and it’s generally out of date. It’s like a vulnerability looking for a next point to happen. I started just logging in and scanning as many SBOMs as I could.”

A week later, a review of whether this was really a bad vulnerability said no, it was not. But what was really good is I was able to work with people and I was able to tell them exactly what products they need to look at in their portfolio. The thing was, SBOMs gave us the ability to be able to do fast, quick searches on large volumes of software to determine whether you had a risk If you had risks, maybe they’re exploitable, maybe they weren’t, but you knew where to go.”

Listing of Components

The other thing SBOMs are really useful at is just looking at what components are in there, Byres said.

Sometimes incidents come out that don’t have listings in the National Vulnerability Database. For example, Byres said, SolarWinds took a long time to list because it really wasn’t a vulnerability. It was just code written by bad guys.

SBOMs are a useful tool that provides a needed service to the industry and that is understanding what is in the software you are running in your facility. But everyone has to understand what they are for.

“It’s not just about vulnerabilities,” Byres said. “It’s just about, what the hell did I buy? What are my teams actually loading? Here’s what it says it’s doing. Here’s what it’s really doing.

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