What is odd is these incidents all occurred on facilities producing from fields determined to be “H2S absent;” therefore, the offshore energy facilities did not have H2S contingency plans in place, according to a report from the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE).
Although H2S is mostly associated with production from sour petroleum reservoirs, H2S can also form in low-oxygen environments from microbial activity during the decomposition of organic material, or by microbial reduction of sulfates.
Hydrogen sulfide is a colorless, flammable, extremely hazardous gas with a “rot- ten egg” smell. The primary route of exposure is inhalation and the gas is rapidly absorbed by the lungs. Concentrations of H2S can range from low levels that irritate the eyes, nose, throat to high levels that can cause shock, convulsions, inability to breathe, extremely rapid unconsciousness, coma and death. Effects at high levels can occur within a few breaths and possibly a single breath.
The following are summaries of unexpected H2S incidents:
During normal production operations, personnel reported a H2S odor downwind of the floatation cell. Using a portable multi-gas detector, a reading of 124 parts-per-million (ppm) H2S was observed at the vacuum breaker. Readings taken 5 feet away were observed at 10 ppm, and at 10 feet the level dropped to 0 ppm. The team isolated the block valve, barricaded the area, and introduced biocide treatments to kill the bacteria and eliminate the presence of H2S.
During routine samplings, operators encountered a reading of 40 ppm H2S in the process stream via Draeger Tube measurements. The following day workers found a reading of 250 ppm in the cargo tanks. Through research, investigators determined the source of the H2S was bacterial activity and not from the wells. The operator took immediate action to remediate the H2S in the liquid and gas phase.
During a transfer of a defoamer between day tanks, workers recognized a sour/rotten egg odor. Workers found a reading of 136 ppm H2S near the tank’s opening using a 4-gas monitor. They quickly secured the tank, and exposed personnel ended up evaluated as a precautionary measure.
After observing an initial H2S reading of 0 ppm, a worker entered a ballast tank for cleaning. After agitating the sludge layer, the 4-gas monitor began alarming with H2S readings as high as 128ppm. The worker immediately exited the tank and work ended up suspended until workers developed an entry plan to include H2S mitigating procedures.
After these incidents came to light, BSEE recommends operators and contractors consider the following:
- Ensure personnel understand that H2S may be a by-product of non-hazardous materials even in non-sour service facilities
- Conduct periodic inspections of stagnant holding tanks to ensure no H2S presence
- Periodically include crew drills focused on unexpected H2S encounters, even on non-sour facilities
- Stay upwind when opening chemical tanks and utilizing a multi-gas detector with H2S capabilities to survey for the presence of H2S
- Assess the presence of H2S at the bottom of the tank when personnel are planning to enter it and agitate any sludge that may be present
- Ensure operating procedures include routine sampling where oil compositions present an increased potential for souring in the production system
- Ensure robust risk assessments when conducting facility level hazards analysis to adequately assess the threat of H2S production in vessels, tanks, or other areas that may routinely hold stagnant liquids with low oxygen levels
- Ensure the Job Safety Analysis includes a discussion of unexpected encounters of H2S and any mitigation necessary when conducting work in areas that have a higher threat of bacterial- generated H2S production (i.e., ballast tanks)
- Review Safety Alert 366 “Dangerous Levels of H2S Detected at Offshore Facilities”
- Follow H2S guidelines per 30 CFR 250.490 and NTL 2009-G31


