Inadvertent removal of pressure retaining components of a valve caused the release of 164,000 pounds of an acetic acid mixture, killing two contract workers July 27, 2021 at the LyondellBasell La Porte Complex in La Porte, Texas.

That is the conclusion of a final report from the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) released its finding Thursday from the incident that left Dusty Day and Shawn Kuhleman dead.

In addition to the fatalities, one other contract worker and one company employee were seriously injured. The facility’s property damage, including loss of use from the incident, was $40 million.

On July 27, 2021, three contract workers employed by Turn2 Specialty Companies at the LyondellBasell La Porte Complex in La Porte were working to remove an actuator from a plug valve in the site’s acetic acid unit.

They were removing the actuator so the valve could end up used as an energy isolation device for a pipe spool repair job. The workers, however, inadvertently removed pressure-retaining components of the valve while attempting to remove the actuator, and the pressure ejected the plug from the valve body.

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Acetic Acid Mixture Erupted
As a result, 164,000 pounds of acetic acid mixture erupted from the open equipment, and all three contract workers ended up sprayed with the releasing acetic acid mixture. Two of the workers – Day and Kuhleman – were fatally injured by chemical burns and toxic inhalation injuries from exposure to acetic acid and methyl iodide. Additionally, the third Turn2 worker and a LyondellBasell responder were seriously injured. LyondellBasell transported 29 other personnel to medical facilities for further evaluation and treatment.

“As this tragic incident shows, even a simple task can turn deadly if it is not performed properly,” said CSB Chairperson Steve Owens. “There have been similar incidents around the country involving plug valves being inadvertently taken apart when removing connected equipment. It is time to improve the design of these valves and take other protective actions, such as signage and training, before more workers are killed or injured.”

CSB’s report discusses how, in the days leading up to the incident, an operations technician discovered a small leak on methanol piping upstream of the unit’s acetic acid reactor. Soon after discovering the leak, the shutdown of an adjacent unit required the acetic acid unit to also shut down.

LyondellBasell decided to use the shutdown opportunity to repair the leak and have contractors at the facility perform the work. To isolate the piping, company personnel chose to use the plug valve located between the leaking pipe and the nearby acetic acid reactor. A plan was developed to remove the actuator which connected to the plug valve.

The contractor work crew began removing bolts they believed were necessary to take off the actuator. The crew was not aware, however, the bolts they removed actually secured the pressure-retaining valve cover in place.

Plug Ejected
The plug ejected from the valve, releasing 164,000 pounds of an extremely hot acetic acid mixture which was 238 degrees Fahrenheit.

CSB’s investigation identified the safety issues below.

  • Valve design to prevent human error. There have been past incidents in which chemical industry workers inadvertently removed pressure-retaining components from a plug valve installed in pressurized service while attempting to remove an actuator. The CSB has identified four other similar plug valve incidents, all of which resulted in fatalities or serious injuries. The recurrence of incidents in which workers have inadvertently removed pressure-retaining components from plug valves points to the need to further re-design these valves such that it would be difficult to remove pressure-retaining components from plug valves while attempting to remove actuating equipment.
  • Providing workers with conditions, procedures, and training to safely conduct work. CSB found LyondellBasell and Turn2 considered the actuator removal job to be a simple task and LyondellBasell did not provide the work crew with a procedure detailing how to remove the actuator from the plug valve. In addition, neither LyondellBasell nor Turn2 trained the work crew on the steps necessary to remove the actuator, and LyondellBasell did not adequately assess the potential risk of exposing the contract crew to hazardous chemicals during the actuator removal in light of historical incidents in the industry in which workers have inadvertently removed pressure-retaining components from plug valves installed in pressurized service.

Post-incident photograph of the methanol leak location, the portion of the piping that LyondellBasell planned to repair, and the location of the plug valve involved in the incident.
Source: CSB


As a result of its investigation, CSB made a series of recommendations.

To LyondellBasell:
Update LyondellBasell policy documents to require procedures are developed for properly removing actuating equipment from plug valves. Require the procedures clearly identify which non-pressure-retaining components are safe to remove and pressure-retaining components that shall not be removed, as well as ensure LyondellBasell personnel are trained on these procedures. Ensure hazardous energy is controlled when performing these procedures, as required by 29 C.F.R. 1910.147. Require in the policy document that risk assessments for process safety are conducted before the actuating equipment removal work is authorized. Ensure that sufficient procedures and safeguards are in place to prevent worker exposure to process fluid.

Update LyondellBasell policy documents to require LyondellBasell competent employee(s), as defined by 29 C.F.R. 1926.32(f), verify contractors are competent, adequately trained, and qualified to perform the required work. To make this determination and to ensure work on process equipment is conducted in a safe manner, LyondellBasell competent employees may be required to oversee the work conducted by contractors on the process equipment. In the updated policy documents, include requirements to ensure contract employees are informed of relevant process hazards and relevant details about the process equipment and are provided with equipment-specific procedures necessary to safely conduct their work.

To Turn2 Specialty Companies:
Update Turn2 policy documents to require Turn2 employees are provided with written, detailed procedures for safely conducting work on process equipment and are trained on the procedures before the work is authorized to be performed.

To American Society of Mechanical Engineers:
Revise American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Standard B16.34 Valves—Flanged, Threaded, and Welding End as follows:
For existing plug valves, require facilities to clearly mark all pressure-retaining components (for example, with paint, accompanying warning signs, etc.). Work with American Petroleum Institute (API) and the Valve Manufacturers Association of America (VMA) to ensure a consistent methodology is specified across both API and ASME standards.

Require that new plug valves be designed, consistent with Prevention through Design principles, to prevent the inadvertent removal of pressure-retaining components when removing the actuator or gearbox. Evaluate past plug valve incidents, and the associated plug valve designs involved in those incidents, when formulating a new plug valve design. Work with API and VMA to ensure a consistent methodology is specified across both and ASME standards.

To American Petroleum Institute:
Revise API Standard 599 Metal Plug Valves—Flanged, Threaded, and Welding Ends as follows:

  1. State there have been multiple incidents in which workers have inadvertently removed pressure- retaining components from plug valves while workers were attempting to remove the valve’s actuator or gearbox.
  2. Recommend facilities using plug valves establish written procedures detailing the correct way to remove the plug valve actuator or gearbox for each specific plug valve design at the facility.
  3. For existing plug valves, require facilities to clearly mark all pressure-retaining components (for example, with paint, accompanying warning signs, etc.). Work with ASME and VMA to ensure a consistent methodology is specified across API and ASME standards.
  4. Require new plug valves be designed, consistent with Prevention through Design principles, to prevent the inadvertent removal of pressure-retaining components when removing the actuator or gearbox. Evaluate past plug valve incidents, and the associated plug valve designs involved in those incidents, when formulating a new plug valve design. Work with ASME and VMA to ensure a consistent methodology is specified across both API and ASME standards.

To Valve Manufacturers Association of America Technical Committee:
Work with ASME and API and develop a white paper to the Valve Manufacturers Association of America addressing the issue of plug valve design with a focus on the following:

  1. Recommend as an industry good practice facilities using plug valves establish written procedures detailing the correct way to remove the plug valve actuator or gearbox for each specific plug valve design.
  2. For existing plug valves, recommend as an industry good practice for facilities to clearly mark all pressure-retaining components (for example, with paint, accompanying warning signs, etc.). Work with ASME and API to ensure a consistent methodology is specified to the industry.
  3. Recommend new plug valves be designed, consistent with Prevention through Design principles, to prevent the inadvertent removal of pressure-retaining components when removing the actuator or gearbox. Evaluate past plug valve incidents, and the associated plug valve designs involved in those incidents, when formulating a new plug valve design recommendation. Work with ASME and API to ensure a consistent design is recommended to the industry.

“This was a tragic accident,” said CSB Investigator-in-Charge Harold Griffin. “The CSB’s recommendations seek to address current safety gaps and make sure that a similar incident does not occur. With the understanding of the changes that need to be made, this type of incident is very preventable.”

Click here to review the entire report.

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