Even though industry experts have been warning about Internet facing industrial control system (ICS) devices for years, there were 40,000 ICS devices exposed to the Internet this past year in the United States, a new report found.

Of those 40,000 devices, 18,000 of the exposed devices are more likely controlling industrial systems, according to part one of the 2024 State of the Internet Report: Industrial Control System from Censys, an Internet intelligence platform for threat hunting and attack surface management.

The Censys research comes on the heels of when the CyberAv3ngers, an Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps-affiliated hacking group, compromised the Municipal Water Authority of Aliquippa, Pennsylvania in November 2023.

There was also the Cyber Army of Russia Reborn, a hacking group linked to Russia’s military intelligence, that targeted water facilities in the small Texas towns of Muleshoe and Abernathy in January this year. The group claimed responsibility for manipulating Human Machine Interfaces (HMIs).

These attacks highlight concerns about the security of critical infrastructure across the U.S. Internet exposure of industrial control system devices increases their susceptibility to attacks.

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While other reports of ICS exposure focused on exposure of the automation protocols themselves, Censys explored the exposure of HMIs and web administration interfaces in addition to automation protocols. These protocols rarely provide context about their operations, while HMIs and web interfaces often display location information or other details useful for identifying ownership. We also examined the networks where these protocols and interfaces run in an effort to understand who might own and operate them.

In the research, Censys found:

  • Over 40,000 Internet-connected ICS devices in the U.S., over half of which are for protocols used for building control and automation. Excluding known building control protocols, Censys found 18,000 exposed devices more likely to control industrial systems.
  • Over 50 percent of hosts running low-level automation protocols are concentrated in wireless and commercial/business Internet service providers (ISPs), including Verizon and Comcast. Over 80 percent of hosts running exposed HMIs are in wireless networks, such as Verizon and AT&T.
  • Nearly half of the HMIs associated with water and wastewater identified could end up manipulated without any authentication required.
  • 1,500 control systems in the UK suffer exposure on the public Internet, as identified through scans of 18 automation protocols (e.g., EtherNet/IP, PCOM, and DNP3).
  • In the UK, Censys identified 1,700 HTTP devices associated with 26 operational technology vendors that are publicly accessible.

In the research, Censys examined the current Internet exposure of ICS devices in the U.S. and the UK, including:

Low-level automation protocols that enable communication between programmable logic controllers (PLCs), remote terminal units (RTUs), HMIs, and higher-level supervisory SCADA systems. Most are near real-time binary protocols that lack any form of authentication.

HMIs, which are the primary interface for operators to locally monitor and control industrial systems, but increasingly support Internet protocols to support remote access. HMIs provide easy-to-understand and easy-to-manipulate interfaces, which make them low-hanging targets for threat actors seeking to disrupt operations. In many cases, HMIs expose identifying information about their device owners.

Web administration interfaces: The digital footprint and attack surface of SCADA systems extends beyond automation protocols and HMIs. In what happens more frequently than it should, PLCs, RTUs, HMIs, and other components have HTTP-based administration interfaces that ship with default credentials.

Quantifying automation protocol exposure is only one part of this story; it’s also important for researchers and analysts to consider the Internet-accessible administration interfaces for these devices. Recent attacks highlight how these interfaces can end up easily accessed and manipulated by threat actors who may not have detailed knowledge of the systems or associated protocols.

Quite a few of the devices identified in the U.S. end up hosted on cellular networks or commercial/business internet service providers (ISPs), according to the report. While HMIs and web administration interfaces occasionally offer clues as to ownership (e.g., city or location information in the user interface), automation protocols rarely expose such context, making it impossible to determine sector or organizational ownership for these devices. In turn, this makes notifying the owners of these device exposures impossible in many cases.

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