Microsoft’s Active Directory is the most widely used authentication and authorization solution in enterprise information technology (IT) networks globally and attackers know that and if they can get in, they own the keys to the kingdom.

Active Directory provides multiple services, including Active Directory Domain Services (AD DS), Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS) and Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS). These services provide multiple authentication options, including smart card logon, as well as single sign-on with on-premises and cloud-based services.

Active Directory’s pivotal role makes it a valuable target for attackers. To that end, Active Directory is susceptible to compromise due to its permissive default settings, its complex relationships, and permissions; support for legacy protocols and a lack of tooling for diagnosing Active Directory security issues.

That is why the Australian Signals Directorate Australian Cyber Security Centre (ASD ACSC), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), he National Security Agency (NSA), the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS), the New Zealand National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-NZ), and the United Kingdom’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-UK) released the joint guide “Detecting and Mitigating Active Directory Compromises.”

Active Directory Susceptible
Specifically, Active Directory’s susceptibility to compromise is, in part, because every user in Active Directory has sufficient permission to enable them to identify and exploit weaknesses.

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These permissions make Active Directory’s attack surface exceptionally large and difficult to defend against. Also contributing to its vulnerability is the complexity and opaqueness of relationships that exist within Active Directory between different users and systems.

It is often these hidden relationships, overlooked within organizations, that malicious actors exploit, sometimes in trivial ways, to gain complete control over an enterprise IT network.

Gaining control of Active Directory gives attackers privileged access to all systems and users that Active Directory manages. With this privileged access, malicious actors can bypass other controls and access systems, including email and file servers, and critical business applications at will.

Attackers can misuse Active Directory to establish persistence in organizations.

Some persistence techniques allow malicious actors to log in remotely, even bypassing multi-factor authentication (MFA) controls. Many of these persistence techniques are resistant to cybersecurity incident response remediation activities intended to evict malicious actors.

Attackers Take Up Residence
Additionally, sophisticated attackers may persist for months or even years inside Active Directory. Evicting the most determined malicious actors can require drastic action, ranging from resetting all users’ passwords to rebuilding Active Directory itself.

The immediate objective for an Active Directory attacker is to escalate privileges and gain control of a domain by targeting the highest privileged user objects, such as those in the Domain Admins and Enterprise Admins security groups.

Preventing malicious actors from acquiring the highest privileges is crucial for limiting their overall access. Therefore, securing privileged access is essential for mitigating Active Directory compromises and should be a top priority.

It is possible to achieve secure privileged access in Active Directory by using a tiered model, such as Microsoft’s Enterprise Access Model.

The following are the key principles of securing privileged access:

  • Tier 0 user objects do not expose their credentials to lower tier systems. Tier 0 user objects are any user object that has significant access in a domain (for example, those in the Domain Admins and Enterprise Admins security group, KRBTGT user objects, the AD FS service account, backup administrators and Microsoft Entra Connect user objects).
  • Tier 0 user objects only manage Tier 0 computer objects. Tier 0 computer objects include Domain Controllers, the AD FS server, the AD CS root certificate authority, backup servers, and the Microsoft Entra Connect server.
  • User and computer objects in lower tiers (such as Tier 1 or Tier 2) can use services provided by higher tiers, but the reverse is not allowable.
  • Enforce hierarchy to prevent control of higher tiers from lower tiers.
  • Privileged access pathways end up secured by minimizing the number of privileged access pathways, implementing protections, and closely monitoring the pathways.

Click here for more on the Active Directory guidance.

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