Air-gapped systems are highly secure against data leaks due to their physical isolation from external networks, however, despite this protection, ultrasonic communication is an effective method for exfiltrating data from such systems.

While smartphones have been extensively studied in the context of ultrasonic covert channels, smartwatches remain an underexplored yet effective attack vector.

SmartAttack is a novel method that leverages smartwatches as receivers for ultrasonic covert communication in air-gapped environments, according to a paper written by Mordechai Guri from the Ben-Gurion University of the Negev in Israel.

This approach utilizes the built-in microphones of smartwatches to capture covert signals in real time within the ultrasonic frequency range of 18–22 kHz.

In addition to air-gapped systems, highly secured networks rely on strict monitoring and data leakage prevention (DLP) solutions to prevent unauthorized data transfers. These systems employ network traffic analysis, endpoint security controls, and strict access policies to detect and block suspicious exfiltration attempts.

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Covert Channels

In such environments, attackers cannot rely on conventional exfiltration methods through the Internet, and must instead exploit non-standard covert channels that bypass traditional networking mechanisms.

Techniques such as acoustic signals, power fluctuations, and peripheral device manipulation provide alternative pathways for stealthy data extraction from secured systems.

Previous research has identified various covert communication channels for data exfiltration, including electromagnetic, optical, thermal, and acoustic channels. Among these, ultrasonic channels have received significant attention due to their stealthiness and the widespread presence of microphones and speakers in modern devices.

Ultrasonic communication typically involves a transmitter and a receiver. The transmitter, such as a PC or laptop with a speaker, generates ultrasonic sound waves that remain inaudible to humans, typically at frequencies of 18 kHz and above.

The receiver, a nearby device equipped with audio recording capabilities, detects and captures these signals. An attacker can encode sensitive data, including keystrokes, encryption keys, credentials, biometric information, and confidential documents, into ultrasonic waves and covertly transmit them to the receiver without the user’s awareness.

SmartAttack

The following illustration of the attack model shows a programmer working in front of a highly secure or air-gapped computer wearing a smartwatch. The infected computer transmits sensitive data, such as keylogging information, modulated onto ultrasonic signals, which can end up covertly received by the smartwatch.
Source: Arxiv.org

Smartphones and tablets have caught the eye of researchers and have undergone studies as both transmitters and receivers in ultrasonic covert channels. However, smartwatches, despite their growing popularity and frequent presence in high-security environments, remain largely unexplored in this context.

The portability and wearable nature of smartwatches significantly enhance their potential as covert communication receivers. These devices are for continuous wear, allowing them to be discreetly carried into various environments, including secured or air-gapped systems.

Seamless Integration

Their seamless integration into daily life ensures proximity to potential signal sources, thereby reducing the transmission distance required for ultrasonic communication. Additionally, the unobtrusive design of smartwatches allows them to operate without drawing attention, a crucial factor in covert cyberattacks.

Unlike smartphones, smartwatches possess unique characteristics that influence their role in ultrasonic covert channels and require careful evaluation.

For one, smartwatches are worn on the wrist, leading to continuous movement that affects signal stability. The orientation of the wrist relative to the transmitting computer impacts signal reception, while the presence of the human body introduces attenuation and signal distortion.

These factors, combined with the smartwatch’s smaller microphone and lower processing power compared to smartphones, create distinct challenges that necessitate specialized analysis.

Electromagnetic covert channels manipulate electromagnetic emissions from computer components to transmit data.

For instance, the AirHopper attack demonstrates data exfiltration from an air-gapped computer to a nearby mobile phone using FM radio signals. Optical covert channels utilize light-emitting components for communication. The LED-it-GO technique controls a computer’s hard drive indicator LED to transmit data to an external observer.

Magnetic covert channels exploit the magnetic fields generated by a computer’s CPU, allowing data transmission to nearby devices equipped with magnetic sensors. Techniques such as ODINI facilitate this type of exfiltration.

Detected by Accelerometers

Vibration-based covert channels leverage malware to induce vibrations in a device’s components, which can end up detected by accelerometers in nearby devices, enabling data transfer via physical vibrations.

Thermal covert channels, such as BitWhisper, induce temperature changes in a computer, which then end up detected by thermal sensors in adjacent systems, facilitating bidirectional communication.

Given their widespread adoption and constant proximity to users, smartwatches present a unique opportunity for covert data exfiltration. The research team focused on utilizing the built-in microphones and speakers of smartwatches to establish ultrasonic covert channels, assessing their feasibility and security implications.

Click here to read the entire paper.

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