The update gives more details about the investigation including a summary of the process upset that led to the incident, background on the refinery, and an outline of the Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board’s (CSB) activities moving forward.
On September 20, 2022, at 6:09 p.m., flammable liquid naphtha began to fill a Fuel Gas Mix Drum (“Mix Drum”) at the BP-Husky Toledo Refinery. The liquid overflowed from the normally vapor-only Mix Drum, sending naphtha through vapor piping to various boilers and furnaces in the refinery.
Origins Early in Morning
Before the blast, the incident had its origins at 3:20 a.m. earlier that day when an emergency pressure-relief valve (“relief valve”) on the feed to the naphtha hydrotreater4Fa (NHT) opened during the Monday night shift.
After a shift change, the Tuesday day shift took over operations, and this same relief valve opened at 8 a.m. Another relief valve just upstream on the NHT feed also opened around this time, and the inlet piping to this relief valve began vibrating severely.
The vibration continued as refinery workers attempted to troubleshoot and reduce pressure in the system. The fire suppression water spray system was activated in anticipation of a release event. The refinery’s emergency response team was called to the scene.
As the piping vibration continued, a weld in a branch connection to a 3⁄4-inch drain valve failed, releasing an estimated 63,625 pounds of naphtha.
The refinery’s emergency response team successfully isolated the leak. The NHT and the saturated gas plant (SGP) shut down, and the coker gas plant (CGP) ended up bypassed. The Crude 1 Unit and all other units continued to operate while refinery teams began to evaluate a repair plan for the failed branch connection.
By 4:30 p.m. on September 20, Crude 1 operations were stable at reduced rates, with naphtha from the Crude 1 tower’s overhead accumulator drum going into storage due to the earlier shutdown of the NHT unit. After the Tuesday night shift personnel arrived, a worker discovered a seal leak on a crude oil pump supplying sweet crude to the Crude 1 Unit. The worker shut down the pump at approximately 5:10 p.m. Another pump, connected to conventional heavy crude oil storage, automatically increased speed to maintain the feed flow rate to the Crude 1 Unit.
Unstable Operating Conditions
The change in crude feed composition combined with the earlier shutdown of the NHT and bypassing of the CGP resulted in unstable operating conditions in the Crude 1 Unit.
During this time all the pump-arounds supplying cooling to the Crude 1 tower were not circulating. The decreased cooling increased the vapor flow up the tower leading to additional material flashing overhead and condensing. The additional overhead flow in the Crude 1 tower resulted in a high liquid level in the Crude 1 overhead accumulator drum.
Liquid from the overhead accumulator drum would normally go to three locations: NHT, CGP, and liquid storage. The NHT remained shut down and the CGP ended up bypassed because of the loss of containment earlier in the day. The liquid naphtha, therefore, was going directly to a storage tank.
To reduce the liquid level in the Crude 1 overhead accumulator drum, at 5:42 p.m., a control room operator opened a flow control valve, sending liquid naphtha to the CGP which was in bypass mode. Naphtha began accumulating in a 138-foot tower until the liquid level reached CGP vapor bypass piping which directed the naphtha to the Mix Drum.
By 6:09 p.m., the Mix Drum level started rising and was soon overfilling, sending liquid naphtha through what was normally vapor piping to various refinery furnaces and boilers. Workers used the plant radio system to report smoke coming out of furnaces and boiler stacks.
High Alarm Level
A control room operator noticed a Mix Drum high-level alarm at 6:16 p.m. and requested via radio for workers to respond to the Mix Drum level. Four workers initially responded and made their way to the Mix Drum.
The workers began draining the Mix Drum to the flare and oily water sewer system. Shortly after this, two of the workers left, and the remaining two workers began draining liquid from the Mix Drum to the ground while wearing Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus.
A worker in the nearby FCC unit told the CSB they saw two workers near the Mix Drum along with a visible vapor cloud. An approaching rainstorm shifted the wind, which likely directed the vapor cloud toward the nearby Crude 1 Furnace, igniting the vapor cloud.
“While the CSB’s investigation is still ongoing, we want to provide the public with important factual details surrounding this tragic incident as we know them now,” said Chairperson Steve Owens. “Our investigation will use this and other information that we gather to make findings and recommendations to help prevent a similar tragedy from occurring in the future.”
Moving forward the CSB will analyze several key areas and how they may have applied to the incident including hierarchy of controls and existing regulations, industry standards, and guidance.
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