This IRGC cyber activity focuses on individuals with a nexus to Iranian and Middle Eastern affairs; such as current or former senior government officials, senior think tank personnel, journalists, activists, and lobbyists, according to and advisory from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), U.S. Cyber Command – Cyber National Mission Force (CNMF), the Department of the Treasury (Treasury), and the United Kingdom’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC).
Additionally, FBI discovered these actors targeting persons associated with U.S. political campaign activity, likely in support of information operations.
Furthermore, the agencies believe the group and the cyber techniques remain an ongoing threat to various sectors worldwide, including but not limited to entities in their respective countries.
Moreover, a joint advisory from the agencies provides observed tactics, techniques, and indicators of compromise (IoCs) likely associated with cyber actors working on behalf of IRGC. The authoring agencies urge individuals in targeted groups to apply the recommendations listed in the mitigations section of this advisory to diminish risk of compromise from these cyber-actors.
Moreover, cyber actors working on behalf of the IRGC gain access to victims’ personal and business accounts using social engineering techniques, often impersonating professional contacts on email or messaging platforms.
Additionally, these actors might attempt to impersonate known email service providers to solicit sensitive user security information on email or messaging platforms. Furthermore, the targets usually have some nexus to Iranian and Middle Eastern affairs, such as current or former senior government officials, senior think tank personnel, journalists, activists, and lobbyists.
Additionally, the FBI found these attackers targeting people associated with U.S. political campaigns. Moreover, the actors often attempt to build rapport before soliciting victims to access a document via a hyperlink, which redirects victims to a false email account login page for the purpose of capturing credentials.
Victims may end up prompted to input two-factor authentication codes, provide them via a messaging application, or interact with phone notifications to permit access to the cyber actors. Victims sometimes gain access to the document but may receive a login error.
Additionally attackers working on behalf of the IRGC tailor instances of social engineering to include areas of interest or relevance to a target, including:
- Impersonations of known individuals, associates, and/or family members
- Impersonations of known email service providers regarding account settings
- Requests from impersonation accounts of well-known journalists for interviews
- Conference invitations
- Speaking engagement requests
- Embassy events
- Foreign policy discussions/opinions and article reviews
- Current U.S. campaigns and elections
Indications of successful compromise include:
- Suspicious logins to victim accounts from foreign or domestic IP addresses
- Creation of message handling rules to forward emails and prevent victims from receiving notifications of the compromise
- Connection of unknown devices, applications, or accounts to a victim account
- Exfiltration and deletion of messages
- Attempts to access other victim accounts
Click here for more information on this joint cybersecurity advisory.

