During production operations, a control room operator observed a decrease in gas lift pressure supplied through a pipeline to a remote well location.

As a result, the control room operator notified the onboard platform operators of the pressure drop and the possibility of a hydrate forming inside of the 3-inch gas lift piping. To remove the possible hydrate, the control room operator and platform operators planned to isolate and bleed the pressure, according to a report with the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE).

From his station, the control room operator closed the pipeline shutdown valve (SDV) upstream of the manual flow control valve. Additionally, the platform operators physically closed the manual isolation valve upstream of the SDV, assumed hydrate location, and departing pipeline.

The platform operators then started to relieve the pressure downstream of the hydrate location to atmospheric pressure, without properly isolating the pipeline from the bleed point, through a ball valve assembly attached to the 3-inch gas lift piping. The ball valve assembly consisted of a threadolet, threaded steel pipe nipples, two 1-inch ball valves inline, and a 90-degree elbow that pointed upward.

With approximately 900 psi trapped behind the valve, the assembly separated from the threadolet, striking one of the platform operators under the left arm pit area, causing bruising and swelling. The injured offshore worker went for medical treatment and later released to full duty. The valve assembly could not be found and workers suspected it fell overboard after striking the worker.

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The incident serves as a precautionary example of the potential hazards associated with improperly depressurizing piping to remove a hydrate. Hydrates can form inside a pipe from a concentration of impurities, natural gas, flow conditions, high pressure, and low temperature.

At the time of the incident, the operators onboard the facility were injecting methanol at a rate of 5 quarts per day to prevent hydrate formation. To that end, workers did not perform a Job Safety Analysis (JSA), so the hazards of relieving pressure to remove a hydrate were never discussed.

The cause of the dislodged valve assembly is still under investigation.

Location of Injured Person (IP) and valve assembly after the incident occurred on the offshore platform.
Source: BSEE


As a result of the investigation, BSEE recommends operators and their contractors consider the following:

  • Isolate all energy sources; then bleeding pressure upstream and downstream of the hydrate simultaneously, maintaining the same amount of pressure so the hydrate does not move and cause a pressure surge, which could damage associated piping
  • Verify JSAs identify potential hazards and mitigate those hazards for the task
  • Ensure when there are changes to equipment all hazards end up identified and mitigated through the Management of
  • Change process, and updating facility information and informing all personnel affected by the change(s).
  • Use gas dehydration systems to remove water vapors to reduce the risk of hydrate formation inside of piping.
  • Verify current platform configurations are on piping and instrumentation diagrams.

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