The release of hydrogen chloride at the Wacker Polysilicon North America facility in Charleston, Tennessee, occurred November 13, 2020.
The CSB’s new safety video, entitled “No Way Down: Chemical Release at Wacker Polysilicon,” includes an animation of the events leading to the incident, as well as commentary from CSB Board Member Catherine Sandoval and CSB Lead Investigators Tyler Nelson and Drew Sahli.
Final Report Released
The CSB released its final investigation report on the incident at Wacker on June 15, 2023. The CSB’s investigation found at the time of the incident there were multiple contract workers present on the fifth floor of an equipment access platform at the facility.
The contract workers were from two different firms, conducting different work, and were wearing different levels of Personal Protective Equipment. One of the workers applied excessive torque to flange bolts on a heat exchanger outlet pipe containing hydrogen chloride, causing the pipe to crack and release the hazardous chemical in the vicinity of the workers.
There was only one way to exit the platform – via a staircase. As the white cloud of hydrogen chloride expanded, the workers on the platform were not able to see their surroundings or access the staircase. Three of the workers who were not wearing full-body chemical resistant suits began climbing down the side of the structure to escape the hazardous cloud. All three workers fell approximately 70 feet during their attempt to escape. One of the workers died from the fall, and the other two sustained serious injuries.
Maintenance Leads to Disaster
“What should have been fairly straightforward maintenance activity by two separate groups of workers turned deadly because of several serious safety issues,” Sandoval said. “The CSB believes that our findings and recommendations will address the issues found at Wacker and prevent another needless tragedy.”

Image of HCl release at the time of release (left) and fully engulfed 15 seconds after release (right).
Source: Wacker
The CSB investigation identified key safety issues:
Written Procedures: Wacker tasked contractor pipefitters with torquing flange bolts on a live piping segment equipped with multiple bolts with differing torque requirements. Wacker did not have a written procedure to execute the torquing task and instead relied on the piping manufacturer’s equipment manual to communicate the torque requirements to the contractors. The manual, however, did not include the torque requirements for the over-torqued bolts. The resulting lack of clarity of the differing torque requirements led to the inadvertent over-torquing of the flange bolts on live operating equipment, the equipment fracture, and the release of HCl.
Control of Hazardous Energy: Wacker did not treat torquing operations on equipment containing hazardous chemicals as a line break or as an activity that required isolation of hazardous energy since it did not involve the intentional opening of a line. As such, Wacker did not perform a risk analysis to determine whether the torque task could safely end up performed on operating equipment, nor did it implement precautions to mitigate the risk of torquing bolts on operating equipment prior to issuing a safe work permit to the pipefitters, which could have restricted the insulators from being present in the area and prevented their harm.
Simultaneous Operations (SIMOPs): When the incident occurred, four workers from a separate contractor company were performing an unrelated pipe insulation task on the structure, as permitted by Wacker, and were present on the fifth-floor platform near the pipefitter work crew. Wacker did not have a policy or procedure for evaluating SIMOPs, a situation in which two or more operations occur together at a time and place. In addition, there is a general lack of industry and regulatory guidance on SIMOPs considerations available to companies such as Wacker. As a result, Wacker did not evaluate the risks associated with the simultaneous work tasks, and the contract workers not involved in the torquing task were unnecessarily exposed to the HCl release.
Means of Egress: During the incident, seven workers were present on the fifth-floor platform equipped with only a single point of egress. Wacker designed the equipment access structure with a single point of egress based on building code requirements for an “unoccupiable equipment platform.” The CSB found the current International Building Code and National Fire Protection Association building requirements do not provide for sufficient means of egress from elevated work platforms used for accessing equipment containing hazardous materials. Additionally, three months before the incident during the Process Hazard Analysis, Wacker employees identified the need for a second point of egress, but Wacker did not take any action to address this recommendation before the incident.
In addition, the video also highlights safety recommendations made by the CSB to Wacker Polysilicon, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, the Center for Chemical Process Safety, the International Code Council, and the National Fire Protection Association.

