The blast and resulting fire occurred during the shutdown of the fluid catalytic cracking (FCC) unit when air inadvertently ended up directed inside the regenerator through the reactor, and the main column, and then into the gas concentration unit.
As the air continued flowing into the gas concentration unit, oxygen accumulated and formed a flammable mixture inside the primary and sponge absorbers, according to a final report from the Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) on the April 26, 2018, explosion. The oxygen also reacted with existing pyrophoric material inside this equipment, creating the ignition source for the explosion.
CSB’s investigation identified six safety issues:
- Transient operation safeguards
- Process knowledge
- Process safety management systems:
- Industry knowledge and guidance
- Brittle fracture during extreme events
- Emergency preparedness
“During transient operations for any process involving flammable materials operators need to understand the potential for air to enter and accumulate inside equipment,” said Melike Yersiz, CSB lead investigator in the video. “Written procedures should be in place that outline safeguards meant to prevent air and hydrocarbon mixtures and operators should be trained to understand why those safeguards are critical.”
Vital FCC unit safeguards are generally known and broadly applied within the refining industry. Not applying these safeguards allowed oxygen to enter and accumulate in process equipment containing flammable material, which ignited and exploded. The Superior, Wisconsin, Husky Superior Refinery also failed to ensure the integrity of its FCC unit slide valves for use during transient operation, according to the report. A severely eroded slide valve contributed to the incident by allowing more air to pass from the regenerator into the reactor.

Video screen capture shows the moment when the blast occurred at the Husky Superior Refinery in 2018, which injured 36 workers and forced 2,500 residents to evacuate.
Source: CSB
On top of that, Husky Superior Refinery did not effectively implement process safety management systems, which also contributed to the incident, according to the report. These ineffective management systems included Husky Superior Refinery’s process safety information which did not include the FCC technology licensor’s operating manual, process hazard analyses that did not effectively identify or control hazards inherent in FCC unit transient operation, operating procedures that omitted key steps, lacked clear instructions, and were not technically evaluated, and an operator training program that did not effectively prepare the operators to shut down the FCC unit safely.
“The incident at the Superior refinery should act as a wakeup call to other refineries, especially those that have hydrofluoric acid alkylation units during transient operations like shutdowns and startups refineries must have necessary safeguards in place and follow correct procedures to prevent disasters from occurring,” said Steve Owns, CSB chairperson in the video.
Click here to view the video.

